Infrastructure and Economic Growth by María Teresa Ramírez & Hadi Salehi Esfahani
1
Banco de la República
Subgerencia de Estudios Económicos
Infrastructure and Economic Growth
María Teresa Ramírez1
Hadi Salehi Esfahani
                                                  
1 This paper is based on one chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaing, 1999.  The paper is a joint work with my thesis advisor Prof. Hadi Salehi Esfahani. We would
like to thank Lee Alston, Warner Baer, Larry Neal and Carlos Pombo for their comments. The first author
would like to thank the Banco de la República of Colombia for its financial assistance.
Contact address: e-mail: mramirgi@banrep.gov.co
                             FAX: (571) 2865936 or (571) 2818531
                             Address: Banco de la República de Colombia
                                            Carrera 7 # 14-78 Piso 11
                                            Bogotá- Colombia2
Infrastructure and Economic Growth
1. Institutions, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth: A Cross Country
Analysis.
 1.1 Introduction
The relationship between infrastructure capital and economic growth has been controversial. A
number of empirical studies have found very high returns to infrastructure investment (Aschauer,
1989; Canning and Fay, 1993). But, the robustness of the results have been questioned in other
empirical studies and surveys (Gramlich, 1994; Munnell, 1992).
2 A major problem seems to be
that interactions between infrastructure and GDP are mediated in the short run by a host of
variables that cannot all be captured in statistical studies, and in the long run causality between
infrastructure and GDP cannot be established. While infrastructure may give rise to higher
productivity and output, past and future economic growth also tend to raise the demand for
infrastructure services and induce increased supply.
3 Moreover, infrastructure inadequacies may
not have tangible output consequences in the short or medium run because infrastructure services
have substitutes and the assets may be used with different intensities.
4 As a result, the empirical
basis of the case for high returns to infrastructure investment has been elusive.
The economic growth literature has avoided the issue by focusing on the reduced form
solution for income growth that includes infrastructure only as part of the initial conditions. This
                                                  
2 World Development Report 1994, especially Box 1.1, also provides a congenial discussion.
3 Indeed, some time-series estimates for the US and other countries find that causality tends to go from
GDP to infrastructure rather than the other way around. Other studies find a reverse causality as well. See
Gramlich (1994), Tatom (1993), and Munnell (1992).
4 For example, in the case of shortage of electricity generation capacity, generator maintenance may be
postponed or users may invest in their own captive generators. In the absence of piped water, households
may obtain potable water by purchasing from trucks or, if geography permits, by digging wells or
collecting rain water. Also, telephone lines may be shared, roads may be overcrowded and trucks may be
overloaded.3
is, however, inadequate because to understand the process of growth one needs to go beyond the
aggregate and distant relationships and to uncover the mechanisms through which various factors
shape aggregate performance. Structural relationships behind aggregate growth are particularly
needed when one tries to identify the source of growth and reach policy conclusions. For
example, a reduced form regression can show that weak institutions and poor infrastructure at the
start of a decade slow down economic growth during the decade (see, e.g., Easterly and Levine,
1997). But, one wonders to what extent exogenous shifts in infrastructure growth can help
concurrent economic performance, how much infrastructure responds to aggregate growth, and
what factors determine the magnitude of that response. Also, reduced form estimations leave open
the possibility that other variables influence growth by working through infrastructure. These
questions, of course, apply to other variables that have been substituted out as well. But,
infrastructure provides an important example because it entails externalities that signify the role
of institutions and other factors that have been found to have substantial impact in reduced form
regressions of growth.
Estimating a structural model of interaction between aggregate economic growth and one
of its components poses an identification problem. Any factor that affects the component may be
affecting the aggregate output through other channels. As a result, identifying the role of the
component becomes difficult. This may be an important reason why structural models of growth
are rare. However, to ask deeper questions about the growth process, the identification problem
has to be solved on theoretical or empirical grounds.
This section is organized as follows. Part 2 develops a structural model that helps discern
the mutual effects of infrastructure and the rest of the economy on each other. We show that the
model can be specified as a recursive system that solves the identification problem and can be
estimated simultaneously. Part 3 specifies the econometric equations that to be estimated. Part 4
presents the results from the cross-country estimates of the model and discusses their policy
implications. The results show that the contribution of infrastructure services to GDP is indeed
quite substantial and in generally exceeds the cost of provision of those services. The model also
allows one to examine the role of various economic and institutional characteristics in helping a
country address infrastructure inadequacies and achieve efficient levels of investment. Although
lack of detailed data precludes a clear identification of the specific factors that shape a country's
response to its infrastructure needs, we show that general capacities to administer and to commit4
to efficient economic policies play important roles in infrastructure performance. Also, lack of
sufficient data restricts the focus of this paper to asset formation in telecommunications and
power sectors. These sectors are likely to be representative of the rest of any country’s
infrastructure and the quantities of their assets tend to be correlated with the quality of service.
However, these relations are by no means one-to-one and future studies should expand the
exercise to include more infrastructure sectors and develop quality measures for them.
1.2 A Model of Output and Infrastructure Growth
Economic growth is the consequence of accumulation of factors that permit an economy to take
advantages of opportunities for increasing its income. To identify the determinants of factor
accumulation rate and, therefore, the rate of growth, it is common practice to start by denoting
production opportunities of the economy as a function that maps the vector of factors into
aggregate output, Y. For the purpose of this paper, let's focus on four types of factors: Labor, L,
capital, k, infrastructure, N, and all other exogenous factors that influence factor productivity, Q.
Assume that labor and the productivity factor grow exogenously at rates l and q, respectively,
while k and N grow endogenously. We let the production function be Cobb-Douglas with constant
returns to scale and, without further loss of generality, assume that  Q represents labor
productivity:
5




                                                  
5 The model can be easily extended to cases of increasing or decreasing returns to scale be replacing 1 in
the exponent of QL with the returns to scale, s. This adds a two terms involving  L and l multiplied by s
-1. We tested the model with those terms and found s -1 to be insignificant. For ease of presentation, here
we ignore the possibility that s „ 1. The Cobb-Douglas assumption is because this is the only functional
form consistent with a steady-state growth in the presence of technological progress that is not exclusively
labor augmenting. For a proof, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Eicher and Turnovsky (1997) have
further shown that unless the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the existence of a steady state with
positive per capita growth in endogenous growth models requires stringent restrictions on the production
function. Since there does not seem to be a definite tendency for growth rates to be ever increasing or ever
decreasing, it is reasonable to assume that the true production function can be approximated by a Cobb-
Douglas one.5
where a and b are positive parameters. Factors other than the ones listed above may be involved
in production as well. But the model can be kept simple by viewing all those factors as part of
those listed.
Infrastructure assets are distinguished from other types of capital because market
imperfections make the accumulation and operation of those assets more sensitive to government
policy and institutional characteristics of the country. Infrastructure services often entail
economies of scale due to network externalities. Also, cost recovery from users tends to be more
difficult and inefficient in infrastructure because often the marginal cost is declining, the services
are viewed as basic needs (e.g., water), or exclusion of non-paying users is too costly (e.g., urban
streets and rural roads). All these elements imply that there is greater potential for regulatory
intervention and institutional arrangements play a more important role in the provision of
infrastructure services. Furthermore, the parameters a and b may diverge from shares of their
corresponding factors in output. This latter effect is important because it suggests that the small
expenditure or cost shares of infrastructure in GDP may be a misleading indicator of the
contribution of those sectors to the economy. In fact, the entire debate about the role of
infrastructure revolves around the claim that b is much larger than the share of infrastructure.
6
To estimate  b, a straightforward procedure may seem to be an estimation of the
production function in log-level or, alternatively, in first-difference or growth form:
(1.2) gy = (1-a -b)q + agk + bgn ,
where gy, gk, and gn  are the growth rates of the per-capita endogenous variables: y =Y/L, k =K/L,
and n = N/L, respectively. This is, indeed, what the initial attempt at measuring the role of
infrastructure tried to do. However, this procedure faces two problems. First, the non-
infrastructure capital stock is very difficult to measure especially because it should include all
types of capital, physical and non-physical. This poses the problem of missing variables that may
be correlated with gn and may bias its estimated coefficient. Second, infrastructure growth is
                                                  
6 Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995) find b to be about 0.1 for the US states and argue that a 10% increase in
infrastructure investment rate would have a trivial impact on productivity growth. However, since the
infrastructure investment rate is in the order of 0.02-0.04, their result seems to indicate severe under-
investment and high marginal product of capital in infrastructure sectors.6
likely to be driven by demand factors that may be motivated by GDP growth. As a result, there
is a simultaneity problem and one needs to identify equation (1.2) from the infrastructure demand
equation that also relates gy  and gn. Dealing with these two problems has been at the heart of the
controversy over the infrastructure-growth relationship. The time-series approach has not
adequately dealt with these problems because the lags seem to be long. Simple instrumental
variables methods are also problematic because they may not address the identification problem.
Our solution to the problem is a simultaneous equations model based on the dynamics
generated by deviations of the economy from the steady state. Letting the units of K and N be the
amount of each that can be formed with one unit of output, capital and infrastructure are
accumulated according to:
(1.3) gk = sky/k - d - l   and
(1.4) gn  = sny/n - d - l,
where d is the depreciation rate and sk and sn are the shares of output allocated to accumulation of
capital and infrastructure, respectively.
7 Households in the economy are interested setting sk and
sn so as to maximize the long term expected utility of their consumption. However, market
imperfections, government policies, and institutional factors may intervene and prevent the
households from receiving the exact marginal benefit of their savings. As a result, the rates of
accumulation generally depend on institutional and policy factors as well as production
opportunities in the economy.
The steady state of this model is a situation where the savings rates as well as the growth
rates of y, k, and n are constant. Equations (1.3) and (1.4) then imply that in the steady state k/y
and n/y are constant and, thus, all three endogenous per-capita variables grow at the same rate,
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7 For simplicity, the depreciation rates of both factors are assumed to be the same.7
Note that we differentiate between the short- and long-run growth rates of Q and indicate the
latter by q
*.
The actual output growth that one observes may differ from its steady state rate because
shocks to the economy affect the current output or the steady state one. When k/y or n/y are away
from their steady-state levels, gk and gn will diverge from q
* and create a tendency for those
variables to converge to the steady state. In the neighborhood of the steady state, the convergence
speed for each of these variables can be calculated based on initial conditions and steady state
parameters. We have:
8
(1.7) gk - q
* » (q
* + l + d){1+[log(sk/sk
*)]/Gk}Gk,
(1.8) gn - q
* » (q
* + l + d){1+[log(sn/sn
*)]/Gn}Gn,
where Gk ” log[wk/(k/y)] is the gap between the initial and the steady state capital-output ratio. Gn
” log[wn/(n/y)] is similarly defined for infrastructure-output ratio. In a model with fixed
investment rates, as in the Solow-Swan growth model, the last terms inside the curly brackets on
the right-hand sides of (1.7) and (1.8) vanish and the growth rates of both factors can be simply
represented by gi = q
* + (q
* + l + d)Gi, i = k, n. However, in the presence of imbalances in capital
stocks, one expects investment rates to deviate from their steady state rates. Indeed, in models
with a representative utility-maximizing household, the investment ratio terms, log(si/si
*)]/Gi, i =
k,  n, are positive and depend on the household's rate of time preference and technological
parameters. When investment decisions involve institutions, the characteristics of those
institutions as well as other economic, social, or political factors may also matter in those terms.
We let log(si/si
*)/Gi =  gi(X), where  gi(.),  i =  k,  n, is a function of a vector of country
characteristics, X. Substituting these in (1.7) and (1.8) and from (1.7) into (1.2), we arrive at
                                                  
8 The derivation for (2.7), for example, is as follows:
gi - q
* = siy/i - (q
* + d + l) = (q
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* + d + l)[Gi +log(si/si
*)].8
(1.9) gy = (1-b)q
* +(1-a-b)(q - q
*)+ (q + l + d)[1+ gk(X)][alog wk - alog(k/y)] + bgn ,
(1.10) gn = q + (q + l + d)[1+ gn(X)][log wn - log(n/y)].
Equation (1.10) allows one to estimate infrastructure growth rate in a reduced form and to
use the predicted values in the output growth regression based on (1.9) to measure b. As in most
of the growth literature, we assume that the population growth rate is exogenous and the long-
term rate of productivity growth, q, is constant across all countries. The steady-state capital-
output ratio,  wk, and infrastructure-output ratio,  wn, depend on  q
* +  l +  d as well as the
preferences that shape long-term investment rates. Since there is no comprehensive measure of k,
one has to substitute from the production function into equation (1.9) to write -alog(k/y) in terms
of more measurable variables:
 (1.11) -alog(k/y) = -(1-a)log y +(1- a -b)log Q +blog n.
As has been commonly observed in the literature, equations (1.9)-(1.11) imply that given
the initial income level, a higher initial productivity factor, Q, should be associated with a higher
per capita GDP growth because it implies a lower capital-output ratio and a greater tendency for
the capital stock to grow. If we control for infrastructure growth rate, the initial infrastructure
level should also have a positive effect on growth for the same reasons. A parametric rise in the
initial level of per capita income, on the other hand, should lower economic growth. The effects
of initial income and infrastructure, however, tend to diminish once the endogeneity of gn is taken
into account because a higher infrastructure-income ratio lowers the infrastructure growth rate.
The terms (q
* + l + d)[1+ gi(X)], i = k, n, are the adjustment rates of k and n toward the
steady state allocation. They indicate convergence rates for each sector when income grows on its
steady-state path. In other words, the terms show how fast the country responds to capital and
infrastructure misallocation. Part of the adjustment, of course, comes from natural population
growth, depreciation, or technological change that make income and capital stocks adjust toward
the steady state. If we let gi(X) = 0, the implied convergence rate for per capita GDP, defined as
gy/log(y
*/y), would be (q
* + d +l)(1 - a -b), which is a standard finding. When the savings rate is
allowed to vary under the most efficient set of institutions, which is captured by the single9
representative household model, the speed of convergence is generally faster because the
household adjusts its savings rate according to the changes in the marginal product of capital.
However, when adjustment requires collective decision-making, this may no longer be the case.
In that case, the process of convergence should tend to slow down as the effectiveness of the
institutions that guide decision-making declines. Indeed, the empirical growth models that drop
the usual assumption of a constant convergence rate by allowing it to depend on the level of
education find this variable to speed up adjustment (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). We specify
the adjustment rate terms for capital and infrastructure separately and include additional country
characteristics in X.
In the next section, we specify the measures that represent various variables for
econometric estimation of the model.
1.3 The Econometric Model and the Data
The above model assumes one infrastructure sector. Extending the model to a case where there
are more infrastructure sectors, with each one's stock entering the production function as a
separate Cobb-Douglas factor is straight-forward. Using (1.6) and (1.11) and letting  t and  p
respectively denote telephones and power production per capita, the system (1.9)-(1.10) extends
to
(1.12) gy = btgt +bpgp +(1-bt -bp)q
* +(1- a -bt -bp)(q - q
*) + (q+l +d)[1+ gk(X)]aGk,




(1.13) gt = q
* + (q
* + l + d)[1+ gt(X)][- log(t/y) + st log(st
*) - ltlog(q
*+l+d)],
(1.14) gp = q
* + (q
* + l + d)[1+ gp(X)][- log(p/y) + sp log(sp
*) - lplog(q
*+l+d)].
For estimation purposes, we replace 1+ gi(X) by a linear function of X. The s and l
parameters in (1.13) and (1.14) are all theoretically equal to one. However, the data for
investment in infrastructure are limited and for the aggregate investment, which we use as a
proxy, the theoretical constraints may be too stringent. Constraining these parameters affects the
coefficient estimates for some of the variables included in the adjustment expressions in (1.13)
and (1.14), but has virtually no effect on the measurement of b's, which is the main goal of the10
exercise. A similar problem exists in the estimation of a in (1.12). In that case, there is an
additional problem that as specified in (1.12) the expressions for 1+ gk(X) and aGk are each
identified only up to a scaling factor. To address these problems, we first we scale 1+ gk(X) by
1-a and aGk by 1/(1-a) and then replace the coefficients where a appears by more general
parameters. That is, the last term on the right-hand side of (1.12) will be estimated as
(1.15) (q+l+d)(q0 +qX)[ -log y + mtbtlog t +mpbplog p + jZ +mklog sk
* + mllog(q
*+l+d)],
where  Z is a vector of the determinants of  Q and (q0,  q) and  j are vectors of parameters.
Theoretically, mt = mp =
a - 1
1




. But, after estimation we found that not all four
coefficients satisfy these constraints. However, as we see below, absence or presence of these
constraints has little impact on the estimates of b's, which are the main parameters of interest.
A key issue in completing the specification of the model is which variables should be
included in X and what role should they be expected to play in the adjustment rate. For rapid
adjustment in response to shocks, a country needs efficient and credible policy-making
machinery. To measure credibility, we use the ICRG contract repudiation indicator (CONTR)
discussed in section 2. ICRG data set also contains an index of bureaucratic quality, which is
closely related to CONTR and does not show any significance when used in conjunction with it.
As a proxy for administrative effectiveness, we use the average years of secondary education
(EDUC) in the population 25 year and older. As argued above, limited educational attainment
indicates the failure of public institutions to help the population obtain a pivotal and valuable
factor for improving its standard of living. It also conveys information about the supply of skills
and the ease with which the government and the polity communicate. Education may also have
other effects on the infrastructure adjustment process. But, on the whole, one expects all these
effects to facilitate adjustment (i.e., raise the adjustment rate).
Another aspect of administrative effectiveness is the ease with which the government can
make decisions. This aspect depends on the extent of divisions in the polity and the policy-
making institutions. To gauging these aspects, we employ the measure of  ethnolinguistic
heterogeneity (ELH) provided by Easterly and Levine (1997). Based on our earlier discussion of11
this variable, we expect a higher value of ELH to impede adjustment toward steady-state
allocation of resources.
In addition to CONTR, EDUC, and ELH, we include time dummies in X to control for
international events and technological shocks that may have affected adjustment. Openness of the
economy and infrastructure availability may also affect adjustment, but those variables did not
show any significance in the regressions and are not included in the result presented here. For
infrastructure sectors, adjustment may depend on their ownership status (public vs. private) as
well. Thus, we include a dummy variable (TPRIV) in 1+  gt(X) which indicates whether the
telecommunication sector is largely operated by private enterprises or not. A similar measure,
PPRIV, is included in 1+ gp(X). The prior expectation is that private operation should speed up
adjustment.
As an indicator of steady-state investment rates, we use the total economy-wide
investment rate averaged over each decade (INVEST). Since this variable is simultaneously
determined with economic growth and we instrument for it by its own lagged value. We also used
a number of other country characteristics (including all the variables employed to represent X and
Q) that may have an impact on the steady state investment rates. These variables showed no
significance in the infrastructure growth equations. In the GDP growth equation, Q is present in
the initial capital gap expression and its impact on investment rate, if any, is indistinguishable
from that on the initial productivity.
For gauging the initial level of productivity, we follow Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)
and Easterly and Levine (1997) to replace (1 -a - bt - bp) log Q with a linear combination of a
number of variables that are commonly believed to influence the initial level of productivity.
These variables are the contract repudiation index (CONTR), educational attainment (EDUC),
ethnolinguistic heterogeneity (ELH), and black market premium on the exchange rate (as a
measure of market distorting policies) (BLACK). The first two are expected to raise productivity
and the latter two should have negative effects. All these variables, except BLACK, are measured
at the start of the period over which growth is observed. BLACK is subject to large movements
and using its one-time observation may introduce large measurement error. To avoid this
problem, we use the average value of BLACK over the period and instrument for it by its lagged
value.12
There is a host of other variables that have appeared in the empirical studies of
economic growth as determinants of productivity. We experimented with many of those variables
in the regressions did not find consistent results. In particular, their statistical significance was
lost once we introduced the infrastructure variables. Moreover, their impact on the parameters of
interest, bt and bp, was negligible. To keep the paper short, we do not report those results here
except of life expectancy at birth (LIFE), which we provide as an example.
9 There are also other
variables that may affect productivity, such as terms of trade level, but we do not have useful
cross-country measures for them.
As pointed out before, the long-term movement of the overall productivity is assumed to
be a constant. For the productivity shock term, q - q
*, we use the rate of change in the terms of
trade over each decade (TOT). The growth rates of CONTR, EDUC, and 1+BLACK are also
likely to contain exogenous productivity shock factors, but did not show any significance in our
regressions once they were appropriately instrumented.
The data used for the estimation of the model is a panel data set for 125 countries over
three decades (1965-75, 1975-85, and 1985-95). The variables used in the regressions and their
summary statistics are presented in Table 1.1. There were many missing values for some of the
variables. The main source of the data is Barro and Lee (1994), augmented for the 1990-95 period
by adding the information from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 1997 (WDI).
For infrastructure data, we used the data set collected by the World Bank for World Development
Report 1994 as well as WDI. The ethnolinguistic measure, ELH, is obtained from Easterly and
Levine (1997). The data for private ownership in infrastructure sectors was constructed by
examining information about individual countries. ICRG's contract repudiation data is available
only for the post 1982 period. To avoid eliminating all observations from the 1960s and 1970s,
we extrapolated these data using similar measures from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence
(BERI) data set, which has information about the 1970s, but for fewer countries. We used the
extrapolated data for the first half of the 1970s as the value of this variable for the 1965-75
period. For the two other decades, we used variable values for the initial year of the decade. We
fixed the depreciation rate at d = 0.04. The main results are not sensitive to this assumption.
                                                  
9 Other popular variables that we applied and did find support for them after accounting for infrastructure
are: openness, government consumption, distance from the Equator, landlocked dummy, shares of primary
products in GDP and exports, political instability, and political hazard (Henisz, 1997).13
Since measurement errors can generate an inverse relationship between growth rates
and initial levels for y, t, and p, the initial levels were instrumented by their lagged values. The
lagged values that were used as instrumental variables for observations in each decade refer to the
earlier decade, except for the 1965-75 observations that use 1960 or 1960-65 averages as
instruments. The three-equation system, (1.12)-(1.14), is estimated by a 2SLS method.
1.4 The Estimation Results
Table 1.2 presents the results of estimation for growth rates of telephones and power production
per capita. Columns (2) and (4) show the results of the full model, while columns (1) and (3)
assume that adjustment is independent of institutional factors. The estimated coefficients all have
the predicted signs and are generally significant. Interestingly, the theoretical constraints on the
coefficients in the initial gap expression, st = lt = 1 and sp = lp = 1, cannot be rejected for the full
model. The adjustment rate is also positive and significant. It is negatively affected by ethnic
divisions, and positively aided by contract enforcement, educational attainment, and private
ownership, although the latter two effects are less significant in the case of the power sector.
The estimated contribution of private ownership to adjustment rate is quite substantial. In
fact, it raises the average adjustment rate for the telecommunications by 0.02, which is 50 percent
of the average adjustment rate in the absence of private ownership! The impact of private
ownership in the power sector is of the same order of magnitude, although it is not statistically
very significant. This may reflect inaccuracy of estimation. But, it may also indicate that
ownership change plays a much smaller role in the power sectors. This point is important
because, in fact, most countries find the privatization of telecoms easier and proceed with it
earlier. A number of factors seem to contribute to this phenomenon. Technological change has
made competitive arrangements in the sector much more feasible and has diminished any positive
role that heavy government involvement may have played a few decades ago. Moreover, rapid
technological change and demand growth in the sector have made it quite costly for the
government to act opportunistically vis-à-vis private investors (Levy and Spiller, 1996). If new
investment is withheld, shortages quickly rise and lead to economic problems and political
discontent. As a result, investors can be more confident that the government will not take away
their quasi-rents. Also, the fact that telecommunications revenues in many developing countries14
depend highly on international calls gives foreign investors more confidence that they can
ensure themselves a minimum of return by controlling revenues generated abroad. In contrast, the
power sector entirely depends on domestic revenues and has experienced a slower technological
change. In fact, many countries that have privatized their power sector, have found that arranging
transmission on a market basis is not an easy task. The power sector continues to require a heavy
regulatory role for the government. Interestingly, using the private ownership dummy as a
determinant of the steady state investment rate in infrastructure did not generate any significant
result. This suggests that private ownership helps infrastructure services reach their steady state
positions faster, but does not affect the long-term infrastructure-output ratios
The role of dynamism in the telecommunications sector is also evident in the much
smaller impact of government commitment and credibility (contract enforcement) in that sector's
adjustment process compared to the power sector or the rest of the economy (shown in Table 1.4
and discussed below). The technological shocks are also reflected in the estimated coefficient for
the time dummy for 1985-95, which seems to be positive in the adjustment expression of the
telecommunication sector, but negative in that of the power sector.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 1.2 clearly show that the infrastructure gap by itself plays
an important role in driving infrastructure growth. However, columns (2) and (4) make it clear
that institutional and organizational factors also play important roles in this "catch-up" effect, as
reflected in the significance of their coefficients and the large rise in the R
2 when those variables
are included in the model. (The sample size difference across regressions explains approximately
half of the rise in R
2, but remainder is still substantial.) To demonstrate the contribution of these
factors to infrastructure growth, in Table 1.3 we present the adjustment rates for various regions,
estimated based on 2SLS regressions of the unconstrained model for the 1985-95 period. To make
the numbers comparable, Table 1.3 assumes that all countries are operating their infrastructure
sectors through public enterprises.
The first notable fact about the figures in Table 1.3 is that infrastructure adjustment rates
are generally faster than the convergence rates of 2-3% per year estimated for GDP per capita
commonly found in the literature (see also the fixed convergence rate in column (1) of Table 1.4).
In fact, as the last two columns of Table 1.3 (which are derived from the GDP growth equation)
show, other types of capital tend to adjust slower than infrastructure. Controlling for income
growth, it takes on average about 13 years for a country to close half of the gap between its15
current telecommunications stock and the steady state path. For the power sector the average
half life of a gap is 18 years and for other forms of capital it is 20 years. The substantially faster
adjustment rate in telecoms is likely to be a consequence of the rapid technological changes that
have cheapened the service and facilitated network expansion.
A second important observation concerning adjustment rates is that they vary greatly
across countries because of institutional differences. For example, while most developed
countries (included in the "other" region in Table 1.3) tend to close half of their telephone
shortage gap in 11 years, a country with a low of education level, such as Algeria, does the same
thing in more than two decades and a country with weak contract enforcement and high ethnic
diversity, such as Iran, takes more than three decades. African countries are is worst position in
this sense and take more than five decades to cover half of their telecommunications gap. A
similar difference between these countries exists in their ability to deal with power shortages,
although in that case, contract enforcement and population heterogeneity play a much more
important role.
Table 1.4 presents the estimation results for the per-capita GDP growth equation. The
first column shows the model with a fixed convergence rate and no infrastructure variables. This
is similar to other basic regressions in the literature where infrastructure is treated as part of the
overall capital accumulation process. However, unlike other models, we have estimated the
convergence rate based on the initial income gap from its steady state path rather than simply as
the coefficient of the initial income level. Nevertheless, the results are quite similar with the
convergence rate being 2.9% and with the terms of trade, contract enforcement, education, life
expectancy, and investment rate raising growth and ethnic divisions and market distortions
lowering it.
The second column of Table 1.4 reports the results when institutional influence on
convergence is taken into account. The new specification is clearly superior because we obtain a
much better fit with the same variables. The second column shows that contract enforcement and
education help improve the overall GDP convergence, while the role of heterogeneity is muted.
All of these variables, however, lose their significance as determinants of the initial productivity
factor. This effect is reinforced once we introduce infrastructure variables, but the performance of
the regression vastly improves even after controlling for the sample size. As columns (3) and (4)
show, infrastructure supply has significant impact on production. Moreover, the role of ethnic16
heterogeneity in adjustment of capital stock becomes much clearer. While variables such as life
expectancy lose their significance, the coefficients of theoretically relevant variables such as
log(q
*+ l + d) gain significance with the right sign and order of magnitude. The role of the 1975-
85 dummy is particularly interesting because it captures the adverse productivity shocks to the
world economy and the enhanced adjustment process that came about through recycling of petro-
dollars. In contrast, adjustment after 1982 may have been slower due to the international debt
crisis and the slow down of capital movements.
Testing for the relationship across variable coefficients in the capital gap expression
rejects the theoretical constraints. As columns (3) and (4) indicate, this is largely due to the
weakness in the coefficient of the initial power supply variable. For the telephones per capita, the
estimated coefficient implies an a of approximately 0.47, which is not too far from the 0.32
implied by the coefficient of log of investment-GDP ratio and 0.55 implied by the coefficient of
log(q
*+ l + d). Whatever the reason for this outcome, the impact on the estimated elasticities of
output with respect to telecommunications and power production seems to be negligible. In
column (5), we show the consequence of imposing the constraint and adjusting the variables
included in each expression. In all our regressions, the coefficients of infrastructure growth
variables maintained their level and statistical significance quite remarkably as long as we
estimate the GDP and infrastructure growth equations together. Interestingly, OLS regressions of
equation (4.1) yield insignificant coefficients for the telecommunications growth variable.
The adjustment rates for non-infrastructure capital can be calculated by dividing the
adjustment rate expression estimate in Table 1.4 by 1-a. The last two columns of Table 1.3 show
the results assuming that a = 0.4. These rates rise with the assumed a. However, as long as the
output elasticity of capital is less than 0.47, which seems a relatively high figure, the capital
adjustment rates would remain generally lower than infrastructure ones and their weighted
average would be below 4.4% per year. This finding is somewhat surprising because non-
infrastructure sectors tend to be more market-based, which is expected to facilitate adjustment.
Evidently, other factors slow down adjustment in those sectors as well.
The estimated coefficients indicate that if the growth rate of telephones per capita
parametrically rises from about 5% per year as in Africa to about 10% per year as in East Asia,17
the annual growth rate of GDP per capita may rise by about 0.7 percentage points.
10 In the
power sector, an increase of per-capita production growth rate from 2% as in Africa to 6% as in
East Asia can raise annual GDP growth rate by another 0.6 percentage points. Although these
estimates are not as large as those found in some other studies, they are by no means trivial. In
particular, they indicate that the elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure sectors is
substantially larger than the share of those sectors in GDP, which means that the marginal
products of infrastructure services are much higher than their cost of provision. The presence of
such inefficiencies is attributable to market failures in infrastructure sectors and underlines the
importance of institutional arrangements that can address those failures and raise service levels.
Our econometric results suggest that the main impact of institutional capabilities on
economic growth is through their contribution to the adjustment rates. As we show in Table 1.5,
the infrastructure and capital gaps implied by our estimates are typically quite large. As a result,
even small increases in adjustment rate can raise GDP growth by large amounts. To see this point,
consider the impact of an increase in Tunisia's educational attainment at the secondary level from
0.73 years (in 1985) to 2.83 (that of Korea in the same year). This will raise Tunisia's adjustment
rates in  telecoms, power, and other capital forms by 2.7, 1, and 2.4 percentage points,
respectively. Given the estimated gaps for these three sectors, this raises the growth rates in those
sectors by 2.0, 1.2, and 1.9 percentage points, respectively. Considering the estimated output
elasticities, these effects raise the GDP growth rate by 0.3, 0.2, and 0.8 percentage points, for a
total of 1.3 percent, which is quite considerable. Similarly, an increase in Tunisia's contract
enforcement rating from 4 to 7 (prevailing in Korea in 1985) will contribute another 0.7
percentage points to the aggregate growth (0.1, 0.2, and 0.4 percentage points through the three
sectors, respectively). These growth rates, of course, decline as assets accumulate and the gaps
diminish, but relatively high growth rates can be sustained for at least a couple of decades.
The estimated gaps reported in Table 1.5 display an interesting pattern. As the logic of
our model suggests, the gaps are larger in the faster growing economies that are either
experiencing a positive shock to their steady-state income path (e.g., East Asia during 1965-95) or
                                                  
10 Note this will have a compounding effect in future years as the level of telephones rises and stimulates
investment in non-infrastructure sectors. But, for an average case, that effect would only add up to an extra
0.04% of GDP growth and would be partially offset by the induced slowdown in telecommunications
investment as the gap in that sector declines.18
recovering from a temporary adverse shock (e.g., Turkey after 1980). Furthermore, there is a
positive correlation among the gaps across sectors, which shows the importance of the aggregate
shocks to productivity and steady-state income path. Middle East North Africa (MENA)
countries, however, display a somewhat different pattern. Their infrastructure gaps are generally
large, while the capital gap of many of them is small. This reflects the fact that the large natural
resource rents in the earlier decades have helped build the capital stock and raise income levels in
the region, but low adjustment rates in infrastructure have prevented those sectors from fully
catching up. Since the mid-1980s, as the rents have declined, the investment rates and incomes
have fallen. This has driven up the capital- and infrastructure-output ratios and has reduced
investment in infrastructure, even though imbalances linger on in those sectors and under more
effective institutional circumstances could have helped maintain a faster pace of growth.
Finally, it is interesting to note that an exogenous 10% rise in GDP, say through an
improvement in the terms of trade, on average raises the telecoms growth rate by 0.68% and the
power sector growth rate by 0.44%. These, in turn will stimulate further investment in the rest of
the economy and, on average, add about 0.16% to the GDP growth rate. Although this effect may
seem trivial for a one time increase in GDP, in a rapidly growing economy, it can quickly
compound over the years and become a tangible contribution to production.
1.5 Summary of Results
The model of economic growth and infrastructure investment estimated in this paper offers quite
striking results. Once one accounts for the simultaneity between infrastructure and GDP growth
rates, the impact of infrastructure on GDP growth turns out to be substantial. Countries can gain a
great deal by improving investment and performance in infrastructure sectors. But this takes
institutional and organizational reforms that are more fundamental than simply designing
infrastructure projects and spending money on them.
A very useful feature of the model is that it allows one to estimate the gaps between the
current and the steady state asset-output ratios as well as the speed of adjustment in assets in
response to those gaps. Using this methodology, we identify a number of key variables that
influence the gaps and the adjustment rates. The estimation results suggest that institutional19
capabilities that lend credibility and effectiveness to government policy play a particularly
important role in the adjustment process.
The research reported in this paper is not free from shortcomings. First, the issue of
infrastructure quality has not been addressed in the model analyzed and estimated here. Also,
other infrastructure sectors (transportation, water, irrigation, etc.) need to be analyzed. Second,
the existing data lack information on institutional details that can shed more direct light on the
sources of institutional capability and the ways it can be built. Third, there is a need to obtain data
on a variety of organizational arrangements that exist in infrastructure sectors and can have
important roles in the performance of those sectors. This study only distinguishes between private
and public ownership, while participation of private sector can have different degrees and public
corporations are themselves differentiated according to the extent of their autonomy and
objectives. Lack of measures for many relevant institutional and organizational variables partly
explains why, despite its reasonable success, the model estimated here leaves the bulk of variation
in infrastructure growth unexplained. Finally, the present model does not  endogenize the
organizational choice between private and public ownership.20




  Growth rate of GDP per capita 0.0155 0.0284 -0.0745 0.1112
  Log of initial GDP per capita 7.7010 1.0305 5.6700 10.1830
  Population Growth Rate 0.0207 0.0117 -0.0070 0.0786
  Log of life expectancy at birth 4.0448 0.2134 3.4904 4.3490
  Average years of secondary education 0.8724 0.8541 0.0100 4.8300
  Log investment as percentage of GDP -2.0614 0.7875 -4.5914 -0.9058
  Log(1+exch. Rate black market premium) 0.1820 0.2710 0.0000 1.8595
  Terms of trade change 0.0067 0.0687 -0.1305 0.5169
  Ethnolinguistic heterogeneity 0.3684 0.3073 0.0000 1.0000
  Contract Enforcement 5.8867 2.0170 1.0000 10.0000
  Initial power production per capita -1.1130 2.0961 -8.2215 3.2137
  Growth rate of per-capita power production 0.0461 0.0864 -0.2598 1.1535
  Initial telephones per capita 3.0261 2.006 -1.3222 6.8964
  Growth rate of per-capita telephones 0.0585 0.0496 -0.1242 0.2781
  Private ownership in telecoms sector 0.0751 0.2639 0.0000 1.0000
  Private ownership in power sector 0.0631 0.2434 0.0000 1.0000
    Sources: See text.21
Table 1.2: Infrastructure Growth Equations
 Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS




 Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
 Number of observations 247 247 238 238
 R
2 0.1551 0.2980 0.2391 0.3427
Variables Coefficient/(t-statistic)
       Constant (q
*) 0.0404 0.0299 0.0497 -0.0094
(3.084) (3.052) (6.521) (-0.894)
 Adjustment Rate Expression
       Constant 0.1565 0.1178 0.2063 0.5562
(2.763) (1.177) (2.248) (2.275)
       Contract Enforcement 0.0351 0.0841
(2.476) (2.263)
       Ave. Years of secondary education 0.1417 0.0915
(2.276) (0.820)
       Ethnolinguistic heterogeneity -0.3182 -0.4796
(-3.895) (-2.235)
       Private ownership 0.2262 0.2282
(2.135) (0.999)
       Dummy for 1975-85 -0.0558 -0.0523 -0.1103 -0.1424
(-1.254) (-1.189) (-0.939) (-1.560)
       Dummy for 1985-95 0.0921 0.0737 0.4027 -0.3009
(1.497) (1.054) (3.433) (-2.355)
 Initial Infrastructure Gap Expression
      Constant -6.5953 -3.5942 -6.2908 -8.0723
(-1.956) (-1.906) (-2.248) (-4.005)
      Investment rate 1.2081 0.6653 1.1318 0.8878
(5.265) (3.066) (6.230) (3.793)
       Log(q
* + l + d) -2.3746 -0.6516 0.0962 -0.8864
(-1.698) (-0.928) (0.084) (-1.513)22
Table 1.3: Annual Adjustment Rates in Telecommunications, Power Production,
and Other Capital, 1985-95

















Averages weighted by: GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP
Africa 2.08 40.0 2.27 34.1 1.33 52.0
South Asia and China 3.29 22.0 2.76 25.4 2.05 33.9
MENA 3.55 21.5 3.10 25.6 2.12 32.7
Latin America 5.63 12.8 3.71 19.5 2.35 29.5
East Asia 5.42 14.2 3.48 25.1 2.39 29.0
Others 8.22 9.4 5.12 14.4 4.87 14.2
  World 6.76 12.9 4.41 17.9 3.89 17.8
a Education data are missing for Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. The average of secondary education
for Middle East North Africa (MENA) countries was used instead.
bYears taken to close 1/2 of the gap assuming steady-state income path.
c Assuming a = 0.4.
Source: Computed based on columns (2) and (4), Table 1.2, and column (4), Table 1.4.23
Table 1.4: Per Capita Growth Equation























 Estimation Method IV IV 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
 Number of observations 217 217 204 204 204
 R
2 0.4127 0.5081 0.6595 0.6584 0.5935
 Adjusted R
2 0.3836 0.4656 0.6202 0.6252 0.5725
Variables Coefficient/(t-statistic)
    Constant -0.0267 0.0074 -0.0165 -0.0177 0.0238
(-0.398) (2.616) (-2.193) (-2.785) (0.911)
    Terms of trade change 0.1164 0.1237 0.1025 0.1019 0.1040
(4.818) (4.957) (4.839) (4.848) (4.896)
 Output elasticity with respect
to
    Telephones 0.1379 0.1382 0.1519
(4.112) (4.254) (4.118)
    Power production 0.1428 0.1453 0.1410
(4.248) (4.340) (4.002)
Adjustment rate expression
     Constant 0.0293 -0.1189 0.1111 0.0828 0.1156
(7.946) (-0.878) (0.717) (0.560) (2.022)
     Contract Enforcement 0.0633 0.0489 0.0576 0.0289
(2.720) (1.777) (2.277) (1.445)
      Ave. Years of secondary 0.2688 0.1436 0.1766
         Education (4.042) (1.672) (2.372)
      Ethnolinguistic -0.0349 -0.3054 -0.2628
         Heterogeneity (-0.360) (-2.385) (-2.177)
     Dummy 1975 0.0454 0.3064 0.2780
(0.582) (2.510) (2.221)
     Dummy 1985 -0.2519 -0.0789 -0.1283
(-3.164) (-0.742) (-1.204)24
Table 1.4: Per Capita Growth Equation (continued)






















 Initial Capital Gap Expression
      Constant -2.1049 0.3904 1.1507 5.7377
(-0.759) (0.104) (0.350) (5.724)
      btlog t         (mt) 2.1024 2.2060 1.2829
(2.545) (2.841) (11.31)
      bplog p        (mp) -0.8303 -0.5441 1.2829
(-0.913) (-0.697) (11.31)
     Contract enforcement 0.1399 0.0553 0.0279 0.1797
(3.916) (1.304) (0.541) (2.653)
      Ave. Years of secondary 0.1920 0.0650 0.0422
         Education (2.466) (1.157) (0.392)
      Ethnolinguistic -0.8283 -0.3772 0.0643 -0.6443
         Heterogeneity (-3.415) (-1.454) (0.209) (-2.632)
     Log(1+black market -0.3748 -1.5263 -0.9234 -0.9650 -0.8923
Foreign exch. Premium) (-0.794) (-3.229) (-2.829) (-3.034) (-3.383)
     Log of life expectancy 2.3109 2.5117 1.0089 0.8879
         at birth (3.558) (3.788) (1.145) (1.137)
     Log of investment-GDP 0.4155 0.5687 0.4728 0.4479 0.2829
         Ratio (2.452) (3.292) (2.390) (2.488) (2.494)
    Log(q
* + d + l) 0.0680 -0.3880 -1.2840 -1.2242 -0.2829
(0.265) (-1.140) (-3.283) (-3.488) (-2.494)
     Dummy 1975 -0.3025 -0.1458 -0.5580 -0.4879
(-2.339) (-1.312) (-2.267) (-2.403)
     Dummy 1985 -0.3178 0.0090 -0.0983 -0.0487
(-2.094) (0.063) (-0.399) (-0.235)
Source: Computed.25
Table 1.5: Estimated Gaps in Telecommunications, Power, and Other Capital, 1985
Region Telecommunications Power Production Other Capital
a
Averages weighted by: GDP GDP GDP
Africa 1.36 0.90 1.25
South Asia and China 3.38 1.62 1.94
MENA 1.33 1.25 0.06
Latin America 0.80 1.26 0.98
East Asia 2.94 2.36 2.02
Others 0.11 1.34 1.46
  World 0.89 1.44 1.51
a Assuming a = 0.4.
Source: Computed based on columns (2) and (4), Table 1.2, and column (4), Table 1.4.26
2. Infrastructure and Economic Growth in Colombia
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between infrastructure and economic growth has been studied in large extend for
the United States and for others developed countries.
11 In general, these studies find that the
contribution of infrastructure to GDP growth is substantial. Nonetheless, this relationship has not
been studied extensively for Colombia. Only recently few studies have attempted to measure the
contribution of infrastructure on the Colombian economy growth.
12 However, these studies ignore
the long run causality between these two variables by focusing on the reduced form for economic
growth that includes infrastructure as only one additional determinant.
13
In this section, we estimate the structural model developed in section one using data from
the Colombian departments. The results from the cross-departmental estimates are in the same
line than those found in the cross-country estimates from section one. That is, the results suggest
that infrastructure contributes considerably to GDP growth and the estimated adjustment rates and
estimated gaps values from the Colombian data are of similar magnitude than those estimated for
the panel of countries.  Unfortunately, the lack of detailed data precludes a deeply analysis of the
role of the institutional characteristics in the evolution of infrastructure and economic growth.
2.2 Data
Empirical studies on economic growth based on cross section estimations using data from the
Colombian departments are scarce, mainly because of the lack of detailed regional data. One
exception are the studies of Cardenas et al. (1993, 1995a, 1995b, 1997), which constituted our
main source of information for this section.
                                                  
11 For instance, see D. Aschauer (1989a, 1989b), A. Munnell (1990), Eberts (1990), Holtz-Eakin (1994) ,
Berndt and Hansson (1991), among others.
12 See Cardenas M., and A. Escobar (1995), Cardenas M, Escobar A, and C. Gutierrez (1995), Roa N.,
Stevenson C. and F. Sanchez (1995), and Sanchez F. Rodriquez J. I. and J. Nuñez (1996).
13 Sanchez F. Rodriquez J. I. and J. Nuñez (1996) use as dependent variable the total, industrial and
agricultural productivity.27
The data used for the estimation of the model are panel data set for twenty four
departments
14 over three decades (1960-1970, 1970-1980, and 1980-1990).  As we will see
below, the lack of complete information of some variables, in particular GDP and human capital,
limits the analysis to the second half of the century. Since there were some missing values for
some of the variables, we ended up with about 57 observations. Table 2.1 summarizes the
statistics of the variables included in the estimations. For infrastructure data we assembled
departmental information for telephone lines for the period 1930-1990 from the Anuario General
de Estadistica de Colombia. For power we used the data set for the years 1938, 1951, 1964, 1973,
1985 and 1992 from Cardenas et al. (1995a). The sources of roads and railroads for the period
1930-1990 are in M.T. Ramírez (1999). For human capital we used the primary and secondary net
enrollment rates from Cardenas et al. (1997) for the years 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1985, 1990.
We took the data for population for the period 1912 to 1990 from the  Anuario General de
Estadistica de Colombia. The data for real GDP per capita are from Cardenas et al. (1993) and
Cardenas et al. (1997) for the years 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1989 and 1992. We also included
variables that have appeared in empirical studies of economic growth such as infant mortality and
crime rates. These variables are also taken from Cardenas et al. (1997). However, these variables
were not significant in the estimations.
Data for investment share in GDP are not available at regional level. Therefore, we use as
a proxy the national investment rate averaged over each decade. This choice has the problem that
assumes that the national level of the series is the same for all the departments. We also include
other national values as proxies for the departmental value such as the rate of change in terms of
trade averaged over each decade. However, this variable was not significant in the estimations.
In addition to the above variables we include regional
15 and decade dummies to control
for regional differences and shocks that may affect the adjustment rate. Table 6 summarizes the
                                                  
14 The departments included are Antioquia, Atlantico, Boliva, Boyaca, Caldas, Caqueta, Cauca, Cesar,
Choco, Cordoba, Cundinamarca, Guajira, Huila, Magdalena, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Quindio,
Risaralda, Santander, Sucre, Tolima and Valle del Cauca. We also include the national capital, Santafe de
Bogota.
15 We construct four regional dummies as follows. The dummy for the Atlantic region includes the
departments of Atlantico, Bolivar, Cesar, Cordoba, Guajira, and Magdalena. The dummy for the Central
region includes the departments of  Antioquia,  Caldas,  Cundinamarca,  Quindio,  Risaralda,  Santander,
Tolima and the national capital,  Santafe de Bogota.  The dummy for the Pacific region includes de28
average value of some variables by region. The main evidence extracted from the table is the
significant difference in the economic conditions across regions. For instance, the central region
has the larger GDP per-capita and the larger infrastructure and education indicators while the
Atlantic departments have the lower indicators.
Finally, the lagged values that were used as instrumental variables in each decade refer to
the earlier decade. For instance, for the decade 1960-1970 we used as instrumental variables the
values from the decade 1950-1960. As we did in section one we also fixed the depreciation rate at
d=0.04.
2.3 Estimations Results
We use the estimating equations from the model developed in section one.
(2.1) gy = btgt +bpgp +(1-bt -bp)q
* +(1- a -bt -bp)(q - q
*) + (q+l +d)[1+ gk(X)]aGk,




(2.2) gt = q
* + (q
* + l + d)[1+ gt(X)][- log(t/y) + st log(st
*) - ltlog(q
*+l+d)],
(2.3) gp = q
* + (q
* + l + d)[1+ gp(X)][- log(p/y) + sp log(sp
*) - lplog(q
*+l+d)].
The three-equation system is estimated by a two stage least squares method. Table 2.2
reports the results from the estimations of growth rates of power and telephones per capita. In the
power growth equation the coefficients have the predicted signs and almost all are significant. In
particular, the adjustment rate is affected positively by education, and negatively affected by the
dummy for the decade of the eighties. This can be explained by the fact that the major power
expansions were made in earlier decades.
16 On the other hand, the initial gap plays a significant
                                                                                                                                                       
departments of Cauca, Choco, Huila, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca, and the dummy for Others departments
includes the departments of Boyaca, Meta and Norte de Santander.
16 However, we run some regressions including a dummy for the decade of the seventies and it appears with
a positive sign but is not statistically significant.29
role in infrastructure growth. However, the theoretical constraints on the coefficients in the
initial gap expression, sp=lp=1, is rejected. This result can be explained by the fact that the
theoretical constraint may be too restrictive to the choice of the aggregate investment rates as a
proxy of the departmental investment values. In particular, it is important to mention that the
coefficient of log(q
*+ l + d) is significant with the right sign, although its order of magnitude is
higher than the theoretical one. Conversely, the coefficient of the investment share appears not
significant.
Regarding the telephone per capita growth equation, the decade dummy for the eighties
and the dummy for the Atlantic region
17 affects positively the adjustment rate while education
does not have any effect. As in the power sector the theoretical constraint on the coefficients in
the initial gap expression, st=lt=1 is rejected. The share of investment, as expected, is significant
with the right sign. But, the coefficient of log(q
*+ l + d) appears not significant in the estimations.
Table 2.3 presents the adjustment rates calculated for four different regions of the country
for the 1980-1990 period. As in section one, the adjustment rates for telephones and other types
of capital are faster than the convergence rates of 2.89% per year estimated for the GDP per
capita presented in column (1) of table 2.4.
18 The adjustment rate of the power sector is of the
same order of magnitude (2.83%) as the convergence rate for GDP. Contrasting with table 3 of
section one, we observe that in general the adjustment rates for telecommunications in Colombia
(7.10%) are higher than those found by the average of Latin America countries (5.63%), but it is
almost of the same order of magnitude as the adjustment rate for the total number of countries
(6.76%). The case is similar for other types of capital. However, the adjustment rates for the
power sector in Colombia are lower than for the Latin America standard, except for the case of
the departments in the central region.
19 To close half of the gap between telephone stock and the
steady state path, in Colombia, it takes on average 9.8 years, for the power sector it takes 28.1
years, and for other types of capital it takes 17.3 years.
                                                  
17 Dummies for other regions appear not significant in the regression, then we excluded them.
18 The value of the convergence rate, 2.89% per year, estimated for the departmental GDP per capita in this
section, is very close to that found in the literature. In fact, this rate is almost the same as the value
estimated in section one for the panel of countries.
19 See Table 6 for a summary of average values of some variables across regions.30
Among regions, the magnitude of the adjustment rates differs, especially for the power
sector. For instance, in the central region the adjustment rates for the three sectors are higher than
the rates for the other regions. This result can reflect the institutional and economic differences
that exist across regions. In fact, the central region includes the more developed departments
20 in
the country. This outcome is consistent with the international evidence found in section one, in
which the developed countries (see table 1.3, section one) have faster adjustment rates for all
sector than the less developed countries.
Table 2.4 presents the results for the GDP per capita growth equation. As we mention
above, the estimated convergence rate is 2.89% (see column one). The magnitude of this
coefficient lies in the range of values reported in the literature (see section one). In Column (2)
we introduce the infrastructure variables. The estimations show that the infrastructure sectors play
an important role in the growth of GDP. Output elasticity with respect to telephones, 0.12, is very
close to the value found in section one. However, the output elasticity with respect to power, 0.35,
is considerably higher in the estimation for Colombia than in the cross-country estimations.
21
Similarly, in the gap expression the initial value of telephones per capita appears significant and
with the right sign and order of magnitude as the expected one while the initial value of the power
sector appears to be not significant. In the adjustment expression, education has a positive and
significant effect as observed in the cross-country exercise.  Besides the infrastructure variables,
the initial gap expression is affected positively by education (at 10% of significance). Surprising,
infant mortality and the investment share do not appear significant in the growth equation. The
coefficient of log(q
*+ l + d) is significant with the right sign but its magnitude is lower than the
predicted by the theory. The regional dummy for the Atlantic region is negative reflecting the low
                                                  
20 It is important to note that the central region includes also the national capital, Bogota whose economic
and social indicators are in general higher than in the rest of the country.
21 The magnitude of the elasticities lies in the range of those found in the literature. J.A. Ocampo (1996)
summarize the empirical evidence between infrastructure stock and economic development in Colombia.
He pointed out that Sanchez (1993) found a elasticity of 0.32 between infrastructure and total factor
productivity and 0.68 between core infrastructure and industrial productivity for the period 1960-1992.
Similarly, the DNP (1995) found an elasticity of 0.34 between core infrastructure and industrial factor
productivity, and an elasticity of 0.17 between core infrastructure and total factor productivity for the
period 1960-1994. On the other hand, Cardenas et al. (1995) found a elasticity of 0.18 between core
infrastructure and total factor productivity, 0.07 between telephone lines and fsctor productivity, and 0.40
between public capital and regional total factor productivity during the period 1950-1994.31
economic growth of this region.  For completeness in the last column of the table we include
roads in the growth equation. Roads do not appear significant in the adjustment expression or in
the initial gap expression.
In general, as in section one, the theoretical constraint over the coefficients is rejected.
One reason could be, as in the infrastructure growth equation, the choice of the aggregate
investment share value as a proxy for the departmental value. On the other hand, the calculated
value of a is lower than the calculated value from the cross-country estimations (see section one).
In fact, the estimated coefficient for telephones implies  a equal to 0.28, and the estimated
coefficient for log(q
*+ l + d) implies a equal to 0.24. Therefore, the implied values for a from
those coefficients are very similar. But they are lower than those assumed in section one. For
comparison purposes we assumed a a=0.4 in the calculation of the gaps in table 2.5.
Table 2.5 presents the estimated gaps. In general, the estimated gaps in
telecommunications and other type of capital for Colombia are very similar to the average of
Latin America countries (section one). However, the estimated gap in power is considerable
lower (0.2) than that estimated for Latin America (1.26). Among regions, the telecommunication
gap is larger for the Atlantic region, which is the region with the lowest number of telephones per
capita but with the highest rate of growth in this sector. The estimated gaps for the power sector
do not differ much across regions. Finally, the capital gap is larger in the Central region, which is
the region with the highest GDP per capita.
2.4 Conclusion
The data for the Colombian departments appear to fit well the model developed in section one. In
fact, the values of the coefficients for the infrastructure variables as well as the adjustment rates
and gap expressions are of similar magnitude as those estimated for the panel of countries. The
impact of infrastructure on GDP growth for the Colombian departments is considerable as section
one predicts.
We found the magnitude of the estimated gaps and rates of adjustment varies across
regions. Differences in the economic and social indicators as well as in the institutions
capabilities of the region can explain the behavior of those values. Unfortunately, the lack of32
detailed data on institutional variables precludes a deeper analysis of the role of the
institutional characteristics in the evolution of the infrastructure provision and economic growth.33




  Growth rate of GDP per capita 0.0216 0.0221 -0.0107 0.1148
  Log of initial GDP per capita 9.5033 0.3413 8.8311 10.3402
  Population Growth Rate 0.0207 0.0137 0.0020 0.0606
  Log of infant mortality 2.8254 0.8049 0.5452 4.1745
  Secondary education 25.0271 17.4075 2.5684 90.5718
  Log secondary education 2.9498 0.7905 0.9433 4.5061
  Primary education 67.8620 16.2458 31.7284 101.345
  Log primary education 4.1868 0.2562 3.4572 4.6185
  Log total investment as percentage of GDP -1.5433 0.0376 -1.5829 -1.4937
  Log public investment as percentage of -2.8552 0.3174 -3.2468 -2.4765
  Initial log power 3.8351 0.5410 2.6714 4.5889
  Growth rate of power production 0.0383 0.0310 -0.0024 0.1385
  Initial log telephones per-capita 2.7830 1.3540 0.3796 6.4656
  Growth rate of per-capita telephones 0.0765 0.0561 -0.0180 0.2626
  Initial log total roads per-capita 0.8526 0.6766 -0.9315 2.1149
  Growth rate of per-capita total roads 0.0063 0.0397 -0.0793 0.1221
    Sources: See text.34
Table 2.2: Infrastructure Growth Equations
 Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of
Telephones Power
 Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
 Number of observations 57 57 57 57
 R
2 0.3586 0.5107 0.7309 0.7405
 Adjusted R
2 0.2574 0.4182 0.6861 0.6885
Variables Coefficient/(t-statistic)
       Constant (q
*) 0.0848 0.0813 0.0258 0.0328
(6.909) (7.071) (2.455) (2.839)
 Adjustment Rate Expression
       Constant -0.1176 0.3570 -0.2517 -0.3804
(-0.785) (1.672) (-0.819) (-1.286)
       Education 0.0716 0.1349 0.3660 0.3957
(1.517) (1.500) (3.653) (4.289)
       Dummy for Atlantic region 0.3515 0.3281 -0.1022
(2.307) (2.626) (-1.112)
       Dummy for 1980-90 0.3955 -0.9284 -0.7814
(2.575) (-3.828) (-3.227)
 Initial Infrastructure Gap Expression
      Constant 3.7787 3.0608 -9.9813 -10.080
(0.600) (0.419) (-5.908) (-5.893)
      Log of investment-GDP Ratio 1.4440 2.0358 -0.3808 -0.3963
(1.978) (2.465) (-1.105) (-1.145)
      Log(q
* + l + d) 3.3689 2.0659 -1.4419 -1.4708
(1.253) (0.675) (-3.550) (-3.417)
Source: Computed.35
Table 2.3: Annual Adjustment Rates in Telecommunications, Power, and Other
Capital, 1980-90


















Central 7.30 9.65 3.63 21.60 4.58 19.32
Atlantic 7.11 9.75 2.36 32.03 4.03 19.12
Pacific 6.74 10.30 2.24 34.47 3.02 23.87
Others 7.01 9.91 2.46 30.85 4.08 20.75
  Total
Departments
7.10 9.76 2.83 28.14 4.05 20.19
aThe Central region includes the departments of  Antioquia,  Caldas,  Cundinamarca,  Quindio,
Risaralda, Santander, Tolima and Santa Fe de Bogota.
The Atlantic region includes the departments of Atlantico, Bolivar, Cesar, Cordoba, Guajira, and
Magdalena.
The Pacific region includes the departments of Cauca, Huila, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca.
Others include the departments of Boyaca, Meta and Norte de Santander.
bYears taken to close 1/2 of the gap assuming steady-state income path.
cAssuming  a=0.3
Source: Computed based on Table 2.2, and Table 2.4.36
Table 2.4: Per Capita Growth Equation








 Estimation Method IV 2SLS 2SLS
 Number of observations 57 57 57
 R
2 0.2345 0.6099 0.6729
 Adjusted R
2 0.1427 0.4463 0.4911
Variables Coefficients/(t-statistic)
    Constant 0.2364 -0.0374 -0.0361





 Output elasticity with respect
to
    Telephones 0.1153 0.0997
(1.722) (1.673)
    Power 0.3555 0.3487
(3.101) (3.213)
    Roads 0.1218
(1.382)
Adjustment rate expression
     Constant 0.0289 -2.0469 -1.5125
(2.504) (-1.122) (-0.949)
      Education 0.0539 0.0387
(1.695) (1.355)
     Dummy Atlantic region 3.5742 3.1581
(1.433) (1.352)37
 Initial Capital Gap Expression
      Constant 5.4760 8.2527
(2.376) (2.801)
      btlog t         (mt) 1.3809 2.5315
(2.002) (1.704)
      bplog p        (mp) 0.8025 1.0087
(1.358) (0.930)
      brog r       (mr) 0.4241
(0.423)38
Table 2.4: Per Capita Growth Equation (continued)
     Education 0.0310 0.0152 0.0091
(2.240) (1.561) (0.561)
     Log of infant mortality 0.0081 -0.2132 -0.3656
(0.045) (-1.191) (-1.267)




     Log(q
* + d + l) 0.6898 -0.3117 -0.0671
(0.239) (-1.641) (-0.227)
     Dummy Atlantic region -0.0643 -0.5248 -0.7659
(-0.165) (-1.942) (-1.613)
Source: Computed.39
Table 2.5: Estimated Gaps in Telecommunications, Power, and Other Capital,
1980-1990
Region
a Telecommunications Power Production Other Capital
b
Central -0.29 0.14 1.72
Atlantic 1.53 0.17 0.61
Pacific 0.50 0.10 0.96
Others 0.94 0.40 0.77
  Total Departments 0.62 0.19 1.07
aThe Central region includes the departments of  Antioquia,  Caldas,  Cundinamarca,  Quindio,
Risaralda, Santander, Tolima and Santa Fe de Bogota.
The Atlantic region includes the departments of Atlantico, Bolivar, Cesar, Cordoba, Guajira, and
Magdalena.
The Pacific region includes the departments of Cauca, Huila, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca.
Others include the departments of Boyaca, Meta and Norte de Santander.
bAssuming a=0.3
Source: Computed based on Table 2.2 and Table 4.4.40
Table 2.6: Average value of some variables by region, 1980
Variable Central Atlantica Pacifica Others
  Growth rate of GDP per capita 0.0217 0.0271 0.0168 0.0067
  Log of initial GDP per capita 9.9763 9.5619 9.5872 9.7264
  Population Growth Rate 0.0164 0.0203 0.0128 0.0164
  Secondary education 52.5891 37.1965 36.6346 38.9932
  Primary education 91.6332 75.6516 77.1423 82.5562
  Initial log power 4.4130 4.2433 4.2205 4.1772
  Initial log telephones per-capita 4.4523 2.7589 3.1882 3.1947
    Sources: See text.41
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